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It has long been recognised that discretion is vital to good
police work. However, in Britain (and many other countries),
practices of discretion in the stop and search context have
come under much scrutiny as it has widely been linked to
racist practices, i.e. a disproportionate amount of Black and
minority ethnic individuals are stopped and searched compared
to White people. In a bid to counteract the discretionary
practices that are seen to be linked to racist stops and searches,
police officers are required (in stops and searches under section
1 of the PACE code A) to have ‘reasonable grounds for
suspicion’. This article evaluates what has been claimed as the
tension between the required reasonable grounds for suspicion
and the need to draw on generalisations (police discretion) for
effective policing.
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Introduction
It has long been recognised that discretion is vital to good police
work (see Kleinig, 1996; Walker, 1993). However, in Britain
(and many other countries), practices of discretion in the stop
and search context have come under much scrutiny as it has
widely been linked to racist practices, i.e. a disproportionate
amount of Black and minority ethnic individuals are stopped and
searched compared with White people. In a bid to counteract the
discretionary practices that are seen to be linked to racist stops
and searches, police officers are required (in stops and searches
under s 1 of the PACE Code A) to have ‘reasonable grounds for
suspicion’ (Home Office, 2005: [1.4]1). This article evaluates
what has been claimed as the tension between the required
reasonable grounds for suspicion and the need to draw on
generalisations (police discretion) for effective policing (Quinton
et al., 2000).
After discussing some of the criticisms of PACE Code A
related to the problems of disproportionality, discretion and
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generalisations, the article looks at evidence from research
conducted in the neurosciences which concludes that intuitive
decision-making processes (allied to generalisations) are often
fundamental to the formation of reasoned judgements. The
article then argues that distinctions between generalisations and
grounded forms of reasoning are often falsely dichotomised and
thus lead to practices likely to affect vital policing skills negat-
ively in the stop and search context. Instead of rooting out
racism, PACE code A has tended to shift the focus to rooting out
subjectivity (for example the development of personalised poli-
cing expertise), which is argued as being at the heart of much
good policing work.
Background
The Home Office states that ‘[S]top and search powers allow the
police to combat street-crime and anti-social behaviour, and
prevent more serious crime’.2 The primary purpose of this police
power is ‘to enable officers to allay or confirm suspicions about
individuals without exercising their power of arrest’ (PACE,
Code A [1.4]). They are seen as a means to:
● Prevent crime occurring in the first place
● Detect crime when it has been committed
● Make communities safer
● Increase public confidence and trust in their local police
service
● Provide the police with intelligence to help tackle local
problems.3
Although both the police and a high proportion of the public
believe that stop and search police powers are a valuable tactic to
use against criminals (ACPO, 2005), it remains today one of the
most contentious aspects of British policing. Numerous indi-
vidual experiences, reports, statistics and research suggest that
there is an unsettling level of ethnic disproportionality; that is,
particular ethnic groups are seen as being targeted by the police
across Britain through the stop and search powers.
There is a range of legislation which gives police officers the
power to stop and search; for example: s 1 of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE); s 60 of the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994; and s 44 of the Terrorism Act
2000. This article is concerned with only s 1 of PACE Code A
because the present author’s particular focus is the notion of
‘reasonable grounds for suspicion’ and its continued relationship
with the problem of disproportionality. Section 1 of PACE Code
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A empowers ‘an officer who has reasonable grounds for suspi-
cion to stop and search a person or vehicle to look for stolen or
prohibited items’ (Ministry of Justice, 2009). Most of the stops
and searches in England and Wales are conducted under s 1 of
PACE Code A; for example, in 2007/08 recorded stop and
searches under the section in England and Wales made up almost
86% of all stop and searches and there were:
● 1,035,438 s 1 stop and searches in 2007/8
● 53,125 s 60 stop and searches in 2007/8
● 117,278 s 44 stop and searches in 2007/8. (Ministry of
Justice, 2009)
The Office for National Statistics estimated that the population
for England and Wales in 2008 was somewhere in the region of
54,440,000.4 These figures suggest a little less than 2% of the
general population of England and Wales underwent a s 1
recorded stop and search in 2007/8. This figure may not be too
much cause for alarm, but it is not until we look at the
percentage of stops and searches by ‘ethnic appearance’ that
alarm bells ring. For every 1,000 White people in England and
Wales in 2007/8, 17 were stopped and searched, compared with
40 for Asian people and a staggering 129 for Black people. That
is, 12.9% of the Black population in England and Wales were
stopped and searched in 2007/8 compared with 1.7% of the
White population (Ministry of Justice, 2009).5 The general
amount of s 1 recorded stops and searches has steadily increased
since s 95 of the Criminal Justice Act required police to start
recording stop and search phenomena. For example, in 2004/5
there were 840,000 stop and searches recorded in England and
Wales, in 2006/7 there were 955,113, but the increase for White
people from 2006/7 to 2007/8 was 7%, for Black people 13%
and for Asian people 16%. All of these figures clearly suggest
that, far from a decrease in disproportionality in ethnic stop and
search patterns, there is a continued increase. What should be
done? Bowling and Phillips argue that ‘[I]f stop and search
powers cannot be effectively regulated – and it seems that they
cannot – then their continued use is unjustified and should be
curtailed’ (Bowling & Phillips, 2002: 1), and this is a point
which often re-emerges (e.g. see Walker & Starmer, 1993).
However, as cited above, proponents for stop and search con-
tinue to argue that the interference caused to liberties are
outweighed as it has now become a vital police activity in
keeping communities safe in that they are effective in disrupting
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crimes before and when committed (Lerner, 2006), and the
practice visibly reassures the public (Reid, 2009).
Since the Brixton, Toxteth and St Pauls riots in the 1980s a
subsequent report (Scarman, 1981) known as the Scarman
Report pointed out a number of deficiencies with stop and search
practices, particularly with regard to racial discrimination. The
report recommended new training procedures and new pro-
cedures objectively to govern stop and search practices (see
Bowling & Phillips, 2002).6 In 1986, PACE (the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984) was introduced to promote safe-
guards against police discriminatory practices by structuring
police discretion, principally embodied in the requirement for an
officer to have ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion’ before a stop
and search could be conducted. There have been numerous
published documents recounting the history of the development
of stop and search legislation and reforms (e.g. see Delsol &
Shiner, 2006; Reid, 2009; Sanders & Young, 2007; Qureshi et
al., 2006), so this section of the article will focus on issues
directly concerned with s 1 of PACE’s ‘reasonable grounds for
suspicion’ in the stop and search context.
Section 1 of PACE 1984 was criticised in a number of ways;
for example, for failing to regulate the discretionary practices of
police officers, for the lack of consideration for informal working
practices during street-level policing and for the lack of clarity
regarding the criteria for reasonable suspicion (Dixon et al.,
1989; McConville et al., 1991). A later report in 1999 by the
Metropolitan Police Services (Fitzgerald, 1999) added that
guidelines underlying stops and searches under the criterion of
reasonable suspicion are highly vague and require interpretation
by officers as they simply cannot cover every eventuality; hence
officers revert to discretionary practices.
In 1999 the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Macpherson, 1999,
the Macpherson Report), famously suggested that the Metro-
politan Police Force was still institutionally racist and that the
disproportionality in police stop and search is the result of police
targeting minority groups. This led to a number of reports; for
example, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary report
(HMIC, 2000) again raised the questions concerning under-
standings of reasonable suspicion, ‘[I]t is the officer alone who
determines, at street level, reasonable suspicion which is a
concept that has eluded academics and lawyers in more reflective
surroundings’ (54). It went on to recommend that ‘Her Majesty’s
Inspector therefore recommends that independent research is
commissioned to investigate; what are the prevailing conditions
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in officers’ minds that leads to a “reasonable suspicion”’ (54).
Thus the Home Office conducted a study in which over 100
police officers were interviewed and 340 hours of observation
data were collected from officers on patrol duty (Quinton et al.,
2000). The following factors were outlined as central to the
arousal of an officer’s suspicion: appearance, behaviour, time
and place, and information and intelligence. These factors were
described as being too broad in that police officers, in practice,
continue to rely on generalisations to form suspicions. This was
seen as posing risks to public confidence. Therefore it suggested
there was a ‘need to improve the reliability of information on
which decisions to stop or search are based’ (Quinton et al.,
2000: vi)
Generalisations are described as ‘broad understandings that
officers have about people, places, or situations that are more
likely to be associated with offending’ (Quinton et al., 2000: 35).
However, the authors identify a tension, through the use of
generalisations to form suspicions, between:
● the need to draw on generalisations for effective targeting
of police activity; and
● the alienation that generalisations, potentially, and neg-
ative stereotypes, in particular, cause. (Quinton et al.,
2000: 62)
Therefore the report recommends that
[T]he legal concept of reasonable suspicion and its applica-
tion needs to be further clarified to specify whether current
officer practices are acceptable. Although the PACE Code
clearly states that stereotyped images should not be used as a
basis for suspicion, we have shown that generalisations are
used by officers, in practice, as a basis for suspicions. As a
result, the PACE Code needs to spell out whether, and to
what extent, generalisations can be used to inform decisions
to stop or search. This is not to say that the law should be
relaxed, but that further clarification is required. If, however,
generalisations are recognised as an acceptable practice,
adequate safeguards need to be in place to ensure that they
are reliable and not used unfairly. (Quinton et al., 2000:
65)
Five years after this report, a stop and search manual was
designed by the Home Office in 2005 by the Stop and Search
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Action Team (SSAT), ‘to offer practical guidance and sound
advice for police and police authorities’ (Home Office, 2005: 5).
The manual draws out what it sees as the ‘key points’ of PACE
code’s definition of reasonable suspicion. It stipulates that
searches, ‘must have an objective basis in fact, information, and/
or intelligence’, then goes on to state that ‘it can be based on
some level of generalisation stemming from behaviour of a
person in a particular situation’ (Home Office, 2005: 17).
Research, however, demonstrates that, as a category, general-
isations stemming from behaviour are very open especially to
abuse. For example, Willis (1983) analysed details from
recorded stops in stop books, stop slips, arrest sheets, charge
sheets and complaints records, and also interviewed officers
about how the stop powers were used. The most common reason
for the stops (over 50%) in the stop books were described as ‘re-
movements’. Further information concerning the stops could
rarely be obtained from the records. When the officers were
asked in the interviews to give details as to what this category
covered, all gave different interpretations as to what it meant and
it was concluded by Willis that ‘this category covered stops
made on grounds which police officers find it hard to specify’.
The stops appeared to be occurring on the basis of intuitive
forms of suspicion (or what may be described as generalisations)
rather than on the basis of objective, reasoned grounds.
Similarly McConville, Leng and Sanders (1991) suggest that
many of the stop reports are constructed through ‘creative
accounting’ after the event of an arrest. As one officer in a study
put it, he would ‘stop a suspect instinctively and then think about
how he would satisfy a disinterested third party’ (McConville et
al., 1991, cited in Maguire et al., 2007: 958). Decisions to stop
and search are often described as a matter of intuition, something
indefinable (McConville et al., 1991; McAra & McVie, 2005).
Similarly, in the American context, Lerner states that the legal
system
forces police officers to prune what they say at suppression
hearing, but it does little to change how they act on the
streets of America. Months will pass before a suppression
hearing, and by then it will be a simple matter to reverse-
engineer the objective ‘reasons’ for the stops. The legal
system in practice rewards those officers who are able and
willing to spin their behaviour in a way that satisfies judges,
while it penalises other officers who are less verbally facile
or who are transparent about their motivations. . . . Police
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officers insist that their hunches about criminals are often
right and that their ‘sixth sense’ proves invaluable in the
field. Nevertheless, when police officers testify during a
suppression hearing, they almost never use the word ‘hunch’
or any of its variants (‘sixth sense’, ‘gut instinct,’ etc.); the
entire language of intuitive thinking is excised from their
vocabulary the moment they assume their place in the
witness stand. Instead they seek to curry favour with judges
at suppression hearings by speaking a carefully pruned
discourse, which emphasizes ‘objective’ criteria that judges
have certified in past cases. (Lerner 2006: 405–73)
Further support for this form of creative accounting comes from
Gergen (1994), who reanalysed a study by Bennett and Feldman
(1981) in which research participants were exposed to 47 testi-
monies that were either genuine attempts to recount the past or
fabricated stories. The stories that were judged to be true were
primarily those conforming to what are discussed as the rules of
narrative and not those that were genuine. Gergen concludes that
cultural expectations are placed upon the individual to tell a
certain kind of story in a particular way in order for it to be
believable. These types of stories tend to display a high amount
of cognitive mechanistic words and are coherently structured
rather than emotional and incoherent. Howard, Tuffin and
Stephens (2000: 295–314) also found that police officers in New
Zealand utilised what was described as a discourse of ‘unspeak-
ability’ with respect to emotions, which were typically ‘framed
as dangerous and threatening to performance, demanding man-
agement and control’ and this in turn ‘enabled officers to present
themselves as both culturally and professionally competent’.
Intuitive Suspicion
Police officers’ need for reasonable grounds for suspicion has, it
appears, led many officers to creatively construct accounts of the
stops and searches. These accounts tend to downplay intuitive,
emotional-feeling-affective-based insights in order for them to
appear to be grounded in objective reasoning. This form of
dichotomisation is discursively drawn from a large historic body
of literature concerning the primacy of decision-making pro-
cesses. It is either argued that they emerge, as Immanuel Kant
suggested, in abstract cognitive faculties or, as David Hume
suggested, within the passions. Goodenough and Prehn (2006)
state that these debates perennially emerge in various contexts;
for example as Intuition versus reason in the law (see Austin,
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1832, repr. 1995; Holmes, 1881; Kelson, trans. Deuticke, 1992;
Goodenough, 1997; Gruter, 1992; Hart, 1961; Weinreb, 1987).
The study of moral reasoning and the human capacity for
normative judgements typically draw on cognitive develop-
mental approaches advocated by Jean Piaget (1965) and
Lawrence Kohlberg (1969), who in turn draw on the Kantian
tradition, favouring conscious reasoning over less conscious
affective processes.
We also see similar kinds of distinctions in much of cognit-
ive psychology’s research into stereotyping. Historically stereo-
types have been viewed as necessarily deficient, subjective and
irrational forms of processing and therefore distinct from so-
called normal processing. They are often seen as tending to form
the basis for negative, hostile, exploitative and unjust judge-
ments. Zawadzki (1942: 140) stated that intellectually they are ‘a
very poor device in thinking’ and so do not constitute good
forms of knowledge. This coincides with Allport’s famous
definition of a stereotype as ‘an exaggerated belief associated
with a category [whose] function is to justify (rationalize) our
conduct in relation to that category’ (Allport, 1954: 191).
Wegener, Clark and Petty (2006) note that contemporary stereo-
typing research, particularly in the field of social cognitive
psychology, has tended to be led by a distinction between
automatic and controlled processes, otherwise known as ‘dual
process models’. Automatic processes are conceptualised as
requiring little to no intention and thought, hence individuals
have little control over these (Bargh, 1994) through which
stereotyping thrives, which in turn influences perception and
judgement (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Devine, 1989; Perdue &
Gurtman, 1990). Controlled processes, in contrast, are thought of
as being the means through which stereotypes are resisted and
avoided (Devine, 1989; Devine & Monteith, 1999; Macrae et al.,
1994). Thus automatic processes are seen as drawing on stereo-
types as heuristics which facilitate short cuts to judgement
utilising only rudimentary cognitive skills (Macrae et al., 1994).
This occurs, for example, when individuals lack: ability (due to
cognitive loading), time, motivation to think more extensively
(Bodenhausen et al., 1994) and accountability (Nelson et al.,
1996; Neuberg, 1989). This body of research easily leads to the
assumption that intuitive forms of suspicion can be allied to
automatic processing while reasonably grounded forms of suspi-
cion can be allied to controlled processes. Obviously the latter
would be favoured as it appears to reduce stereotyping and hence
reduce racist forms of police decision making.
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Yet more recent studies by Damasio with colleagues
(Benchara et al., 2000) demonstrate ways in which non-
conscious (automatic) forms of processing are at the heart of the
development of decision-making processes which are related to,
and arguably may be considered as, the reasonable grounds for
suspicion. They looked at the autonomic nervous system arousal
of participants trying to win money in a card gambling task.
There were three groups of participants: a normal group and two
brain lesion groups (one group consisted of participants with
bilateral lesions to the ventromedial (VM) sector of the pre-
frontal lobe and the other group consisted of participants with
bilateral amygdala lesions). Those who tended to win more
money (developed appropriate gambling strategies) were the
normal group of participants. Throughout the tasks skin conduct-
ance reactivity (SCR) was measured. The normal group pro-
duced increases in SCR in response to rewards and punishments
that resulted through gambling decisions. As they became more
experienced in the game they started to produce increases in
SCR prior to gambling decisions (anticipatory responses). The
increases in SCR were significantly increased for the normal
group prior to making a risky gamble compared with a less risky
gamble. The VM group also produced increased SCR in
response to rewards and punishments; however, these were
lower responses compared to the normal group and they did not
produce anticipatory SCR increases. The amygdala group neither
had SCR increases due to rewards and punishments nor anticip-
atory SCR increases. Hence the normal group all developed
appropriate gambling strategies which enabled them to win
money while the lesion groups did not win money. Throughout
the task the participants were asked to declare whatever they
knew about the task on four occasions. Damasio distinguishes
four sequential levels of knowledge that the participants
declared.
The first was a ‘pre-punishment’ period, when subjects
sampled the decks before they had yet encountered any
punishment. The second was a ‘pre-hunch’ period, when
subjects began to encounter punishment but still had no clue
about what was going on in the game. The third was a
‘hunch’ period, when subjects began to express a hunch
about which decks were riskier but they were not certain.
The fourth was a ‘conceptual’ period, when subjects knew
very well that there were good and bad decks and which
decks were good and bad. (Benchara & Damasio, 2005)
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They correlated the SCR for each period and found that for the
normal participants there was no significant SCR activity during
the pre-punishment stage. At the pre-hunch stage there was a
significant increase in SCR activity due to anticipatory
responses, which is before any conscious knowledge had devel-
oped, and the SCR activity was sustained for the remaining
period of the task. Of the normal participants in Benchara and
Damasio’s study, 30% were not able to communicate how they
developed winning strategies. Damasio therefore argues (Tranel
& Damasio, 1991: 217–29; Damasio, 1994) that gambling deci-
sions were made through an affective autonomic biasing system:
we might say the gambler felt suspicious before going on to
formulate what may be considered any conscious reasoned
decisions. Thus the reasoned world was born of the felt world.
Damasio and colleagues nominate this autonomic biasing system
the ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ and distinguish neural pathways
involved in these processes. Somatic markers are non-conscious
bodily responses to stimuli which in turn influence decision
making; we might otherwise think of them as ‘intuitions’ or ‘gut-
feelings’. More support for this autonomic biasing system comes
from another experiment that replicated the above gambling
study but this time included only normal participants (Carter &
Pasqualini, 2004). It was found that the participants who had
higher anticipatory SCR activity tended to develop the best
gambling strategies. This then would seem to suggest that
heightened non-linguistic activity was of primary importance to
correct decision-making processes. Of interest here is that win-
ning strategies were formed through the development of somatic
markers which in turn were instituted through repeated experi-
ences. The repeated experiences form patterns or what are
considered as ‘generalisations’ or perhaps even ‘stereotypes’.
Lerner forcefully argues that in the context of America the
creation of false dichotomies of what is reasonable and unrea-
sonable suspicion-related decision-making processes are leading
to significant flaws and compromises in police activity. He
argues that the term ‘reasonable suspicion’ has left many experi-
enced police officers hamstrung as intuition and extra-discursive
knowledge gained through years of policing experience is very
much disregarded through the introduction of what is known as
the ‘Terry laws’ (similar to PACE Code A) in America. Lerner
states that the ‘dichotomy between facts and intuitions is built on
sand’; emotions and intuitions are not contrary or ‘obstacles to
reason’ but can be seen as ‘indispensable heuristic devices that
allow people to process diffuse, complex information about their
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environment and make sense of the world’ (Lerner, 2006: 405).
Lerner suggests that ‘hunches’ or what may be considered as
‘intuitions’ and ‘gut-feelings’ are often a form of thinking that
may be difficult to be persuasively conveyed in words. This does
not mean that they are inferior to verbalised suspicions but may
draw on a vast recollection of previous experience that may be
too complex to convey in words. A skilled and experienced
craftsperson often responds to problems without words. Lerner
argues that the more we become an expert at a task, the more our
knowledge becomes tacit or incommunicable. This is reflected in
Polanyi’s (1983) arguments that ‘experts do not resort to first
principles and consciously work through a series of logical steps,
rather they rely on their experience and instinct; they have a
sense of what feels right and what feels wrong’ (cited in Lerner,
2006: 407). Thus Lerner argues that the legal rules governing
police conduct are based upon mistaken assumptions about
human cognition.
In a British study completed by Jordan (2000) one of the
papers focused, among other aspects, on fairness in the applica-
tion of the police stop and search act, particularly ‘officer
judgement’ within the stop and search context. Jordan begins this
part of the paper by attempting to further understand ‘reasonable
suspicion’, which is cited as a ‘nebulous concept’ (2000: 23).
Jordan argues it is widely accepted that officers exercise a degree
of judgement as to whether something they see on the street
requires intervention. However, what is less readily accepted
is that police have to rely on their own ‘stereotypes’; this is
particularly so when ‘rapid decision’ making is called for. Jordan
argues that the word ‘stereotype’ here does not necessarily
connote unsophisticated and insensitive automated responses but
‘is another way of saying that they are drawing upon their
experience, and (inevitably) cultural influences, to summarise
information about possible courses of action prior to selecting
one and acting upon it’ (2000: 24).
Damasio’s ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ is of benefit here in
helping us to understand these sorts of intuitive processes. He
supplies evidence which suggests that there is a constant map-
ping within certain parts of the brain of the bio-regulatory state
of the body; this is coupled with the monitoring of the external
world. When stimuli are encountered, maps previously held in
the neural system associated with the stimuli are rapidly recon-
stituted. In this way the feelings associated with the previously
experienced stimuli are re-evoked. These feelings then act as a
covert biasing system which facilitates rapid decision making,
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marking options with valences according to associated feelings
of previous related experiences. This does not mean that
decision-making behaviour is deterministic but that somatic
markers facilitate processes by rapidly influencing decisions (we
can either act or not act on the basis of what our feelings are
suggesting). Of course, racist police officers are likely to have
somatic markers that influence racist forms of decision-making
processes, as they are likely to have developed particular types
of maps/feelings for particular ethnic groups. The fault here,
however, lies with the racist police officer and not with the
intuitive processes through which decisions to stop and search
are made. As has been argued, there is always going to be room
for discretionary practices in the stop and search context; pre-
vious approaches of ratcheting up the need for officers to account
for their stops and searches on so-called reasonable grounds are
likely to simply make more officers better at ‘creatively account-
ing’ for their actions, whether they are racist or not.
Conclusions
What appears to have occurred through the introduction of the
concept of ‘reasonable suspicion’ into the stop and search
context is a shift of focus from rooting out racism to rooting out
subjectivity. This is both impossible, as decision-making pro-
cesses cannot be divorced from subjectivity, and simply futile, as
subjectivity (for example the development of personalised poli-
cing expertise) is at the heart of much good policing work. The
distinctions between suspicions being based on subjective gen-
eralisations or objective grounds appear to be in many instances
posited within a play of semantics rather than an in-depth
understanding of decision-making processes. The faulty logic
seems to lie within an understanding that generalisations lead to
stereotyping which in turn leads to racism. Pickering (1995)
describes what he sees as an ‘abiding problem in stereotyping
research’, which was initially formulated in Lippmann (1965
[1922]), credited with introducing the word ‘stereotype’ into the
social sciences. Pickering suggests that Lippmann conceptual-
ised the stereotype in the following opposed ways:
A Inadequate and biased, as endorsing the interests of those
who use them, as obstacles to rational assessment, and as
resistant to social change.
. . .
B A necessary mode of processing information, especially in
highly differentiated societies, an inescapable way of creat-
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ing order out of ‘the great blooming, buzzing confusion of
reality’. Here it is equated with broader patterns of typifying
and representing, and indeed with our general means of
thinking and making sense of the world. (Pickering, 1995:
693)
Pickering (2001) argues that conceptualisation (B) incorrectly
assumes the word ‘stereotype’ is a synonym with the word
‘category’. In contrast to stereotypes, categories are seen as
flexible and unfixed while stereotyping attempts to deny any
flexible thinking ‘in the interest of the structures of powers
which it upholds’. He writes:
Thinking in relation to categories is a necessary way of
organising the world in our minds, creating mental maps for
working out how we view the world and negotiating our way
through it in our everyday social relations and interactions. It
would be difficult to imagine how the world would seem
without using categories in general speech and writing as
basic tools for organising our understanding. (Pickering,
2001: 3)
Although stereotyping has many overlaps with the above con-
ception of thinking in relation to categories, clearly stereotyping
which forms prejudices and in turn influences discriminations
against particular races and ethnicities are the type of processes
which the police should be focused on rooting out. Yet miscon-
ceptions concerning false dichotomies between, for example,
cognition/emotion, automatic/controlled, suspicion/reason have
led to the development of practices that do little actually to
reduce racism in the stop and search context. It seems that
effective policing skills are being discredited through faulty
understandings of the processes involved in the development of
suspicion. Too much emphasis on the need for reasonable
grounds for suspicion does not address the underlying problems
which lead to racist policing. Jordan states that ‘[S]ocial identity
stereotypes will derive from the shared experience of other
officers; messages picked up through general life experience; and
from the media’ and adds: ‘[L]ittle is known about how officers
integrate and use this material’ (2000: 24). Although Jordan
states that it is hoped officers’ ‘templates’, which influence stop
and search decisions, are formed in the main through the patterns
of intelligence that an officer receives, but of concern here is that
stereotyping may open the way for forms of licensed prejudice.
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Jordan then recommends that officers learn ‘to separate out the
components of and influences upon those stereotypes and help
officers to develop the “right” templates’ (2000: 24). To this end
Jordan recommends the use of Personal Construct Psychology
(PCP) to facilitate police officers’ better understanding of their
subjectivity when undertaking decisions to stop and search. This
certainly appears to be a step in the right direction, yet there are
a number of relevant critiques of Kelly’s PCP that state it
insufficiently addresses issues concerned with language, com-
munication, ideology and power issues (e.g., see Solas, 1992;
Balnaves & Caputi, 1993), which are arguably at the heart of
racist police activity. It seems that resources could be more
profitably spent by governing bodies investing in researching
psychosocial factors that influence subjectivity and hence
decision-making processes to further develop training and
practices which aim more accurately at reducing prejudiced
policing.
Notes






5 The Ministry of Justice states that ‘[C]aution should be exercised
when using these per 1,000 population figures as they rely on
estimates of the BME population based on the ethnicity breakdown
of the population from the 2001 Census. As such, minority ethnic
populations may be under (or over) estimated’. For further analyses
of UK stop and search figures see Bowling and Phillips, 2007; and
Waddington et al., 2004.
6 The Brixton riots were seen to be the result of Operation Swamp,
which led to 118 arrests (12.5% arrests per stop); a disproportionate
amount of the stops were Black people.
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